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Abstract  
This paper raises some issues regarding the institution 
of restrictions as a public-law category. The state of 
scientific study of the problem, its origins, evolution 
and modern embodiment is analyzed. The criteria and 
conditions for the restriction of human and citizen's 
rights and freedoms in national legislation are 
established. Based on the results of the study, a 
conclusion was made on the role of law as the main 
form of fixing restrictions in the public sphere. 
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Introduction 
In legal doctrine, the problem of the concept, essence, 
and content of the institution of restrictions, due to the 
complexity and multidimensionality of the latter, is 
debatable. The subject of numerous studies is the 
socio-legal and political and legal restrictions in the 
exercise of state power (governance), the essence and 
content of restrictions in the general legal terms, 
restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the 
individual (person, citizen), concepts, notion and 
system of restricting state power. Restrictions are 
subjected to research from various positions and points 
of view: the needs of a particular kind of social 
relations and the appropriate legal means of 
influencing them; as methods and ways of legal 
regulation; and as the principles and functions of law. 
This is no accident, since, as E.A. Sedov rightly notes, 
"the search for the optimal balance between the 
provision of the necessary freedom to every member 
of society and the reasonable restrictions of this 
freedom for maintaining public order have been and 
are one of the most complex, sensitive and urgent 
social problems for all human communities" [1].  
Indeed, the formation of civil society and the rule of 
law is closely intertwined with the restrictions. On the 
one hand, a rather unilateral fascination of some legal 
scientists in recent decades with the ideas of 
inviolability of rights and freedoms in the legal status 
of the individual has inevitably led to the fact that the 
rights of some members of society have come into 
conflict with the rights of others, with common and 
public interest. This gave rise to the problem of finding 
a balance in the system of rights, freedoms, duties and 
restrictions of the legal status of the individual in order 
to maintain stability in the country, ensure the 
conditions for the existence of each individual and the 
progressive development of society and the state. On 
the other hand, the fundamental signs of the rule of law 
are also related to restrictions, such as the partition of 
powers, the restriction of power to law and human 
rights, otherwise state power risks becoming a 
spontaneous uncontrolled phenomenon, devoid of its 
main purpose – serving the interests of the individual 
and society.   
Therefore, it is fair to recognize the opinion of the 
French law scholar J. Selle about the nature of power: 
"The foundations of any power are overarching and 
totalitarian; all power tends to be absolute inside and 
dominant outside the system” [2].  
It is necessary to pay attention to the dual (and even 
contradictory) nature of the restriction of state power: 
on the one hand, it is an absolute blessing, since it 
ensures the implementation and protection of human 
rights and freedoms; on the other, the state must be 
strong to ensure protection of civil rights by the 
potential possibility of using means of state coercion. 
Thus, according to the German law scholar R. Iering, 
"the weakness of power is the mortal sin of the state, 
which is less forgiven to leaders than cruelty and 
arbitrariness" [3]. 
Thus, restrictions are necessary, both in terms of 
deterring abuse of rights and misconduct of individual 
citizens for the sake of general (public) interest, and 
the arbitrariness of the state as a whole and state bodies 
(officials) in particular.  
 
Methodology 
The methodological basis of the research is formed on 
the basis of the application of various general 
scientific methods and ways of scientific knowledge 
(analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction, system-
structural, formal-logical approaches), as well as 
specific scientific methods – historical legal, formal 
legal, comparative legal and interpretative. 
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Discussion and Results 
We shall start our study with the note that there is 
currently no single conceptual theory (the official 
doctrine) of legal restrictions: restrictions of the rights 
and freedoms of the human and the citizen and state 
power, as well as the fact that the institution of 
restrictions has not been investigated, as the legal 
reality requires.  
In particular, serious questions today are caused by the 
lack of a uniform approach to the general theoretical 
interpretation of the concept of legal restrictions 
applied to various subjects of law (individual and 
collective) in legal science and practice, and, as a 
consequence, the inability of sectoral legislation to 
regulate the relations in question concerning the 
established sphere of legal effect. The legal system 
(including the domestic one) more than ever needs a 
comprehensive and systematic general theoretical 
study of the institution of restrictions, its concept, 
essence, content, structure and functions. 
It is noteworthy that the problem of searching for 
criteria for restricting public power arose in the ancient 
centuries in the works by Aristotle, Plato, Panetia, 
Polybius, Lucretia, Cicero about the three main forms 
of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy), 
the development of this evolutionary chain and 
deviations from "right" forms, etc. 4.  
In the later period, the concepts of the restriction of 
state power were also developed in the doctrine of the 
right to war and peace by G. Grotius 5, the theory of 
the state by T. Hobbes 6, the theory of separation of 
powers by S. Montesquieu 7, the theory of social 
contract by J.-J. Rousseau 8, the doctrine of law by 
I. Kant 9, the philosophy of law by G.W.F. Hegel 
10, the doctrines of the limits of state activity by W. 
Humboldt 11, of the "struggle for the right" by R. 
Jhering 3, of the social transformation of law and 
state by L. Duguit 12, of the constitution and 
sovereignty of the state by C. Schmitt 13, the 
institutional theory of public law by M. Hauriou 14 
and many others [15].  
However, no unambiguous approach to the question of 
their legal nature has been received, since the concept 
of public legal restrictions had various embodiments 
in different periods. 
Thus, at first, as a public legal restriction, the idea of a 
"counterweight" was proposed, which recognized 
other authority as the main criterion for restraining 
state power: the divine power was recognized in the 
doctrines by F. Aquinas 16, the constituent power - 
by J. Locke 17, and democratic power - by J.-J. 
Rousseau 18.  
Later, the idea of separation of powers emerged, which 
at the legislative level was most vividly embodied in 
the US Constitution as follows: "The legislative, 
executive and judicial bodies should be divided and 
different, so that none of them could use the authority 
that definitely belongs to another: a person cannot 
simultaneously exercise power greater than the power 
of one body” 19.  
Consequently, the right (and law as its basic form) was 
recognized as the most important and universal way of 
setting forth public restrictions.  
However, in the opinion of M. Horwitz, the rule of law 
as restriction of state power protects the citizen, but at 
the same time he gives it to the power of soulless forms 
that have replaced the arbitrariness, deprived of the 
possibility to take into account the human factor 
(suffering, helplessness, etc.): "The rule of law creates 
a formal equality, which is an important virtue, but 
contributes to inequality by creating a consciousness 
that radically separates right from politics, goals from 
means, processes from the results” 20.  
Therefore, human rights currently come to the fore as 
a criterion for limiting state power, which in turn can 
also be limited by the state in certain situations, such 
as the protection of the foundations of the 
constitutional order, morality, health, rights and legal 
interests of others, ensuring the country's defense and 
state security, etc. 
The theory of the restriction of power to human rights 
received its real legal embodiment in international 
instruments by pointing out the primacy of human 
rights and the permissibility of restricting them only 
according to certain goals. Part 2 of Article 29 (2) of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates 
that "in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are determined by law solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society” [21]. 
This provision was also set forth in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature on December 16, 1966. 
Restrictions must be carried out, according to Art. 4 of 
this Covenant, solely "in order to promote the general 
welfare, to be determined by law, and they cannot 
contradict the nature of the rights being restricted" 
[22]. 
Restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens is 
established in domestic (national) legislative acts in 
two main ways: either by setting forth additional 
conditions, prohibitions and duties that restrict the 
exercise of subjective rights and freedoms, or by 
increasing the powers of state authorities and their 
officials, or both simultaneously. The result is the 
same – a reduction in the options for possible behavior 
that constitute the content of the subjective rights and 
freedoms of citizens.  
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We should note that the forms of restriction of citizens' 
rights and freedoms provided for by legislation can be 
different: a ban on a certain version of the realization 
of law or freedom, that is, the establishment of the 
boundaries of conduct (relative prohibition); a ban on 
the execution of the right (freedom) in general (or 
absolute prohibition); interference (intrusion) of 
authorized state bodies into the subjective right 
(freedom) of a citizen; duty; and responsibility.  
In our opinion, in order to prevent an arbitrary 
restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens and 
abuses by public authorities in this area, there are clear 
criteria for restricting these rights: 
- the legal basis for the restriction of human rights 
should be only the law - the Constitution (the basic 
law), constitutional or ordinary laws; 
- the purpose of restricting human rights is the 
protection of the foundations of the constitutional 
order, morality, health, rights and legal interests of 
others, ensuring the country's defense and state 
security; 
- conditions for the establishment of such restrictions 
(necessary in the aggregate) - a real or potential 
possibility of causing harm to the state and public 
interests; impossibility to protect the said interests by 
other means; proportionality of imposed restrictions; 
and if the harm caused is less than that prevented; 
- Restrictions should be of a general (non-
personalized) nature, not retroactive, and should not 
change the essence of the most restricted constitutional 
law (freedom); 
- Restrictions should correspond to the generally 
recognized principles and norms of international law; 
- Restrictions should neither concern fundamental 
human rights and freedoms nor be discriminatory; 
- The law restricting the rights and freedoms of 
citizens must be clearly formulated and allow no 
arbitrary (spread or restrictive) interpretation. 
Finally, we should say a few words about the 
convergence-based approaches to limiting state 
power. They are developed by the proponents of the 
discursive theory of law, which was formed within the 
framework of the communicative theory of the society 
by J. Habermas, based on the interconnection 
(interdependence) of human rights and the idea of 
democracy, the idea of people's sovereignty [22].  
According to this concept, legitimacy is not reduced to 
legal formalization or the ability of the authorities to 
effectively use the resources of violence; legitimacy is 
the laws that embody the basic principles of law: social 
harmony, social compromise, and social justice.  
Thus, the idea of restricting state power to human 
rights best fits into the Western concept of human 
rights, which treats the human rights as a requirement 
for the state to commit or refrain from doing certain 
actions; a means of combating the abuse of state 
authorities. Human rights are a means of combating 
abuse of power, since of all the above "internal" 
criteria for limiting state power, they alone are an 
indispensable "external" factor of controlling its 
activities, a peculiar manifestation of the power of the 
individual, and the will of civil society.  
Opponents of this theory argue that the recognition of 
human rights as primary in relation to the effectiveness 
of governance can cause powerlessness of state power, 
which, in turn, threatens security and freedom and can 
become a determining factor for establishing 
arbitrariness. Continuing this idea, we can 
unreasonably oppose state power and freedom. 
However, the restriction of human freedom by state 
power is at the same time a necessary condition for its 
provision and protection. Thus, in reality legal 
freedom is confronted only by state power, not 
restricted to law. 
 
Summary 
The results of the study allow us to conclude as 
follows: the institution of public law restrictions has a 
long history; its conceptual foundations originated in 
ancient times, have made a long way in their formation 
and development and are now consolidated in 
international legal instruments and constitutional acts 
of various states.  
As the final of the analysis of the problem stated in the 
paper’s title is an indisputable fact that the right (in its 
natural and legal manifestations) as the official 
civilized, universal and most effective regulator of 
social relations, the most important social, cultural and 
moral value, the measure of freedom, and the 
responsibility of the individual must be the main form 
of setting forth restrictions for both state power and the 
rights and freedoms of the human and citizen. 
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